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THE DEEP SEABED HARD MINERAL
RESOURCES ACT AND THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
CAN THE CONFERENCE MEET THE MANDATE
EMBODIED IN THE ACT?
On June 28, 1980, President Carter signed the Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act. With the enactment of this domestic sea-
bed mining legislation, it is now practical to evaluate whether
UNCLOS III negotiations propose an international seabed min-
ing regime acceptable to the United States. This Comment will
analyze the composition and decision-making procedures of the
proposed International Seabed Authority with respect to access
to the seabed; security of tenure for United States citizens who be-
gin exploration for, or commercial recovery of minerals before the
Law of the Sea Treaty enters into force; and the economic feasi-
bility of seabed mining under the proposed treaty in an effort to
determine the treaty's acceptability to the United States.
INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS I) began work on creating a body of law designed
to govern the use of the oceans and the ocean's resources by man-
kind.1 One of the most difficult tasks for UNCLOS m negotiators
has been reaching agreement on the appropriate legal machinery
necessary to govern the exploitation of the mineral resources of
the deep seabed. 2 For some time many Nations have recognized
that there are manganese nodules containing minerals necessary
for modern industry on the ocean floor beneath certain depths.3
1. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975).
2. The History of Negotiations Concerning the System of Exploitation of the
International Seabed, 9 N.Y.U. J. Iwr'r. L & PoL. 483 (1977).
3. Manganese Nodules are oval rocks generally found at depths between
3,200 and 6,000 meters. These nodules contain over 20 elements. Of principle eco-
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The United States and other industrialized nations now possess
the technology necessary for commercial recovery of these miner-
als. 4
Each year since 1971, legislation has been introduced in the
United States Congress to create a domestic regime for the explo-
ration and commercial recovery of manganese nodules by United
States citizens.5 Until this year, the President had vetoed the leg-
islation stating that unilateral legislation might endanger the
chances for a successful conclusion of UNCLOS H negotiations.6
Still, seabed mining legislation was introduced again in 1980.
On June 28, 1980, President Carter signed the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act (the Act).7 The Act performs four
primary functions. First, the Act creates a temporary legal frane-
work that regulates seabed mining by United States citizens dur-
ing the period after passage of the Act and before ratification of
the Law of the Sea Treaty.8 Second, in the event negotiations fail
to produce a treaty acceptable to the United States, the regulatory
framework established by the Act can become permanent. Third,
the Act is a set of instructions for Law of the Sea negotiators re-
garding the general policies Congress intends the final text of any
Law of the Sea Treaty to contain.9 Finally, the Act may be viewed
as a measuring rod by which the Senate will evaluate a treaty
submitted to it for ratification. 10 The first and second purposes of
the Act are contained in the substantive provisions of Title L-1
_The third and fourth functions, the mandates embodied in the
Act, are found in Title ].12
Two principal factors influenced President Carter's decision to
support unilateral seabed mining legislation. One was the dead-
lock in negotiations concerning the decision-making procedures of
the proposed International Seabed Authority.'3 The other was
the fear that the American seabed mining industry might aban-
nomic interest today are manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt. Murphy, The Poli-
tics of Manganese Nodules: International Considerations and Domestic
Legislation, 16 SAN DrNGo I REV. 531, 533-34 (1979).
4. Id.
5. 126 CONG. REC. H4641 (daily ed. June 9, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Murphy).
6. Id.
7. 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1284 (July 3, 1980).
8. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, Title I,
94 Stat. 553 (1980) [hereinafter cited as "the Act"].
9. 126 CONG. REC. H4655 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Santini).
10. Id.
11. The Act, supra note 8, at Title L
12. Id. Title IM
13. Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea, 1977-1978, 16 SA
DIEGo L. REV. 705, 718 (1979).
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don the development of seabed mining technology.14 The seabed
mining industry has expressed dissatisfaction with the possibility
of agreement within the foreseeable future, and the economic fea-
sibility of seabed mining under the international regime being
designed by UNCLOS M.15
From July 28, to August 29, 1980, the Ninth Session of UNCLOS
III met in Geneva, Switzerland. In the wake of the Ninth Session,
and with the enactment of domestic seabed mining legislation, it
is now practical to evaluate whether the UNCLOS I negotiations
propose an international seabed mining regime acceptable to the
United States.
This Comment will discuss the composition and decision-mak-
ing procedures of the International Seabed Authority. To deter-
mine whether the proposed international regime is acceptable to
the United States, this Comment will analyze access to the sea-
bed; security of tenure for United States citizens who begin explo-
ration for, or commercial recovery of, minerals before the Law of
the Sea Treaty enters into force; and the economic feasibility of
seabed mining under the proposed treaty.
THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE
Title II of the Act declares the intention of Congress that any
international agreement to which the United States becomes a
party should provide: assured and nondiscriminatory access to
the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed1 6 security of ten-
ure to United States citizens who have undertaken exploration or
commercial recovery under the Act before the international treaty
enters into force;'7 and continuation of seabed mining operations
under terms, conditions and restrictions which do not impose sig-
nificant new economic burdens on seabed miners operating pur-
suant to the Act.18 Whether an international agreement conforms
to the guidelines of Title H will be determined by consideration of
the totality of the provisions of such agreement.19 Before ratifica-
tion of any international agreement, the Senate will consider the
discretionary powers granted to the International Seabed Author-
14. 126 CONG. REc. H4642 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Murphy).
15. Id.
16. The Act, supra note 8, § 201(1) (A).
17. Id. § 201(1) (B).
18. Id.
19. Id. §201(2).
ity and the practical implications for the security of tenure that
such discretionary power will entail.20 In determining the impli-
cations of such discretionary power the Senate should consider
the structures and decision-making procedures of the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority, the availability of impartial and effective
procedures for the settlement of disputes; and any other relevant
features that may tend to discriminate against exploration and
commercial recovery activities undertaken by United States citi-
zens.
21
THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL REGIME
The currently proposed Law of the Sea Treaty would establish
the "International Sea-Bed Authority"22 (Authority) to govern
mining activities in "the Area."23 The Authority would consist of
an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat.24 Policy-making func-
tions would be shared by the Assembly and Council.25
The allocation of power between the Assembly and Council has
been a source of much conflict.26 The Group of 77,27 representing
the interests of the developing nations, consistently pushed for
the Assembly as the supreme policy-making body. The industri-
alized countries insisted that the bulk of discretionary power be
vested in the Council. The reasons for these divergent views are
the relative composition and decision-making procedures of each
body.
Under the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal
Text) (Draft Convention), the Assembly would have the power to
establish general policies affecting activities in the Area.28 But
the Assembly is composed of one member from each State that is
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The most recent negotiating text is the Draft Convention on the Law of the
Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as "DCLOS/1T"].
23. "The Area" refers to the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof be-
yond the limits of national jurisdiction. Id. art. 1., para. 1.
24. Id. art. 158, para. 1. The Secretariat would be comprised of a Secretary-
General and staff. The Secretary-General would be the chief administrative officer
of the Authority, presiding over all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.
Id. art. 166.
25. Id. arts. 160 and 162.
26. See text accompanying notes 37-50 infra.
27. The Group of 77 is an alliance of developing nations formed at the first
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. The Group of 77
now has over 100 members. The History of Negotiations Concerning the System of
Exploitation of the International Seabed, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 483, 486 n.18 (1977).
[hereinafter cited as "The History"].
28. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 160, para. 1.
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a party to the agreement.29 For example, if 150 States ratify the
treaty, then the Assembly would have 150 members. Each mem-
ber of the Assembly would have one vote on any question before
it.30 Thus, the one-member one-vote system effectively grants pol-
icy-making power to a special interest group3' only if that group
can gather the required number of votes to pass a substantive
measure, or if the group can collect enough votes to block ac-
tion.32 This system will inure to the benefit of the developing
countries because of their substantial numbers.3 3 The United
States and other industrialized nations have understandably re-
fused to rely on the benevolence of the Group of 77 to protect pri-
vate miners or state-sponsored mining interests. Rather, the
industrialized nations have insisted on effective representation
and security for their mining interests.34 This representation is
found in the composition and voting procedures of the Council.
The Council is the executive organ of the Authority.35 It is em-
powered to establish the Authority's spec/ policies in conform-
ance with the general policies established by the Assembly.36
The significance of the Council's power can be illustrated by
briefly considering the evolution of the negotiations on the alloca-
tion of power between the Assembly and the Council. The devel-
oping countries wanted the Assembly to have supreme policy-
making power.37 Under such a system the developing countries
29. Id. art. 159, para. 1.
30. Id. para. 5.
31. For the purposes of this discussion seabed miners, other than the Enter-
prise, will be considered as a special interest group.
32. The number of votes necessary for passage of substantive issues is a two-
thirds majority, provided that such a majority constitutes at least a majority of the
members participating in that session of the Assembly. As a direct corollary, it
would require one-third, plus one, of the members to block a measure. DCLOS/
IT, supra note 22, art 159, para. 6.
33. The Group of 77's over 100 members has stood as a unified block since the
early stages of the Conference. Since a one-member one-vote system would
clearly benefit a large unified group, the Group of 77 may be able to effectively
control the Assembly. Thus, as a block, the Group has lent its full support to the
proposition that representation and decision-making in all organs of the Authority
should be based on the principle of sovereign equality of all nations. The composi-
tion and voting procedures of the Assembly mirror this view. For a discussion of
the evolution of the Group's position on this subject, see Adede, The Group of 77
and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority, 7 OcEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 31 (1979).
34. See, e.g., The History, supra note 27.
35. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art 162, para. 1.
36. Id.
37. See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
would benefit, because the Assembly will be composed of one
member from each State and policy decisions will be made by a
one-member one-vote system.38 Since there are more developing
nations than developed nations, the developing countries would
control the Assembly. Thus, the developing nations fought for the
Assembly as the policy-making organ of the Authority with the
Council as a clearly subordinate executive organ primarily " re-
sponsible for the execution and implementation of the policies
emanating from the Assembly."3 9
The first negotiating text issued by UNCLOS III, the Informal
Single Negotiating Text (SNT),40 provided that the Assembly
would be "the supreme policy-making organ of the Authority"41
whereas the Council was to "act in a manner consistent with
[the] general guidelines and policy directions laid down by the
Assembly."42 This language was unacceptable to the developed
nations. It implied that policy decisions would be made in the As-
sembly, where the developed countries would have little power.
The Council would act merely as an executive organ responsible
for implementing the directives of the Assembly. The SNT also
provided no assurance that Council decisions would not be over-
ruled by the Assembly on a one-nation one-vote basis.43 Thus,
any protection of industrialized country interests built into the
composition and procedures of the Council were tenuous at
best.44
The Revised Single Negotiating Text45 (RSNT), issued after the
1976 Geneva session, reflected a significant shift in the balance of
power between the Assembly and Council.46 Rather than being
the "supreme policy-making organ of the Authority"47 the Assem-
bly became the "supreme organ ... with power to prescribe the
general policies to be pursued by the Authority .... "48 The
Council was to have the power "to prescribe the specific policies
38. Id.
39. Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed
Authority, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 31, 35 (1979).
40. Informal Single Negotiating Text, A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part 1, (1975) [herein-
after cited as "SNT"], partially reprinted in Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L 763 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Oxman"].
41. Id. art. 26, para. 1, reprinted in Oxman, supra note 40, at 768.
42. Id. art. 28, reprinted in Oxman, supra note 40, at 768.
43. Id.
44. Oxman, supra note 40, at 768.
45. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1/Part 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
"RSNT"J.
46. Compare SNT, supra note 40, art. 26, para. 1, [and] art. 28, para. 1, with
RSNT, supra note 45, art. 26, par. 1, [and] art. 28, para. 1.
47. SNT, supra note 40, art. 26, para. 1.
48. RSNT, supra note 45, art. 26, para. 1.
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to be pursued by the Authority"49 rather than to "act in a manner
consistent with the general guidelines and policy directions laid
down by the Assembly."5 0 In addition, the RSNT specifically
warned the Assembly to "avoid taking any actions which may im-
pede the exercise of specific powers and functions entrusted to
another organ."51 All of the subsequent negotiating texts have in-
corporated these changes. 52
The practical effect of these changes is to make the Council the
dominant policy-making organ of the Authority. The Council will
be able to implement the general policies established by the As-
sembly in such a way as to temper or negate their impact. Since
the Council's function is to prescribe the specific policies pursued
by the Authority53 and the Assembly may not impede the exer-
cise of those specific powers,5 4 the Council will be able to act
without fear of reversal by the Assembly. Thus, to determine
whether the Law of the Sea Treaty can meet the mandate of Title
11 of the Act, it is necessary to consider whether the Council will
adequately represent the interests of the United States. This re-
quires an analysis of the composition and voting procedures of
the Council.
CoMPosrrON OF THE CoUNcm
The Council is to be composed of thirty-six members.5 5 The
Draft Convention provides for the selection of eighteen members
on the basis of equitable geographic distribution,56 and eighteen
members as representatives of special interests.5 7 The eighteen
members representing special interests will be composed of: four
49. Id. art. 28, para. 1.
50. SNT, supra note 40, art. 28, para. 1.
51. RSNT, supra note 45, arts. 24, para. 4 and 26, para. 3.
52. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10, art.
156, para. 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as "ICNT"]; Informal Composite Negotiating
Text (Revision 1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1, art. 158, para. 4 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as "ICNT/R1"]; Informal Composite Negotiating Text (Revision
2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 2, art. 158, para. 4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
"ICNT/R2"]; DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 158, para. 4.
53. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 158, parm. 4.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 161, para. 1.
56. Id. para. l(e).
57. Id. paras. 1(a)-(d). Under the SNT and the RSNT only 12 members of the
Council are chosen with the view toward representation of special interests. Six
members would represent the industrialized nations' views and six representing
members chosen from the eight States Parties with the largest
preparatory investments in deep seabed mining;5 8 four members
selected from the major importers of commodities produced from
minerals to be derived from the Area;59 four members from the
major exporters of the minerals to be found in the Area 60 and six
members chosen from a category including developing States
with large populations, landlocked or geographically disadvan-
taged states, major importers of the minerals to be acquired from
the Area, states which are potential producers of the minerals
found in the Area, and least developed States.6'
The Western industrialized nations could control three of the
four seats on the Council reserved for the States with the largest
preparatory investments in deep seabed mining.62 Presently the'
nations most involved in the development of seabed mining tech-
nology are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the Soviet Union and the United States.63 The Socialist
countries of Eastern Europe are guaranteed one seat from this
group.6 4 The three remaining seats would be filled by nations
sharing the same basic interests in seabed mining as the United
States except for the Soviet Union. -With the exception of Austra-
lia, all of these countries are heavily dependent upon foreign sup-
plies of the minerals to be derived from the Area.65 All have
invested large amounts of money in the development of seabed
mining technology. It should therefore be in their common inter-
est to vote as a block in the Council.
The United States and its allies could control three of the four
seats in the Council allocated to the nations which are the major
the interests of the States. See SNT, supra note 40, art. 27, para. 1; RSNT, supra
note 45, art. 27, para. 1.
The ICNT increased the Council members representing special interests to its
present level of 18. See ICNT, supra note 52, art. 159, para. 1.
58. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 161, para. l(a). Of these four members at
least one shall be chosen from the Eastern (Socialist) European region. Id.
59. Id. para. 1(b). One of the four selected under this criteria will be from the
Eastern (Socialist) European region. Id.
60. Id. para. 1(c). At least two of these four members will be selected from
developing countries whose exports of the minerals derived from the Area sub-
stantially impact their economies. Id.
61. Id. para. 1(d). Granting representation to developing states which are po-
tential land-based producers of the minerals to be found in the Area represents a
change from previous negotiating texts. Compare ICNT/R2, supra note 52, art.
161, para. 1(d), with DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 161, para. 1(d).
62. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 161, para. 1(a).
63. J. SULUVAN, PACIC BASIN ENTERPRISE AND THE CHANGING LAw OF THE
SEA 57-61 (1977).
64. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art 161, para. 1(a).
65. J. SULLrVAN, PACIFC BASIN ENTERPRISE AND THE CHANGING LAW OF THE
SEA 57-61 (1977).
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consumers or importers of the minerals to be derived from the
Area.66 With the exception of the Soviet Union, the nations quali-
fying as major importers or consumers are all Western industrial-
ized nations.67 The Socialist countries of Eastern Europe are
guaranteed one seat of the four, thus the Western industrialized
nations will be assured of three additional seats in the Council.
The nations occupying the ten remaining Council seats allo-
cated to special interest groups68 cannot be expected to protect
United States interests. Four members are to be selected from
States that are major land based exporters of the minerals ac-
quired from the Area.69 It would be unreasonable to expect these
land based exporters to protect the interests of the seabed miners
when they will be in direct competition for the world minerals
market. Six members of the Council are to be chosen from devel-
oping countries with special interests.70 Representatives from de-
veloping nations cannot be expected to protect United States
interests. Thus, the remaining industrialized nations representa-
tives must come from the eighteen seats allocated on the basis of
equitable geographical distribution.71
Eighteen members of the Council are elected to ensure an equi-
table geographical distribution in the Council as a whole.7 2 The
geographical regions from which members will be chosen are "Af-
rica, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Western Europe
and others."73 The number of seats allocated to each region
under this section will depend upon how the principle of equita-
ble geographical distribution is defined. One commentator has es-
timated that the United States and its close allies will be able to
control either three or four of the Council seats allocated to
"Western Europe and others."74
66. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art 161, para. 1(b).
67. Commodity Research Bureau, [19801 COMMODITY YEARBOOK 119. Major im-
porters were ascertained by comparing the Table listing the largest producers of
copper with the Table listing largest consumers of copper, on the rationale that
those countries consuming, but not producing, are importing.
68. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art 161, paras. l(c)-(d).
69. Id. para. l(c).
70. Id. para. l(d).
71. Id. para. l(e).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The History, supra note 27, at 499-500 n.69. For the purpose of this discus-
sion it will be assumed that only three seats on the Council will be controlled by
the United States and its allies on the basis of equitable geographical distribution.
The United States and its close allies can thus expect to control
nine of the thirty-six Council seats.75 Therefore, nine members of
the Council may be reasonably relied upon to support the princi-
ples of assured and nondiscriminatory access to the minerals of
the deep seabed, and security of tenure under reasonable terms,
conditions and restrictions -for those States or their nationals who
have begun seabed mining activities before the International Sea-
bed Authority comes into being. The influence that nine mem-
bers may have on policy emanating from the Council is
dontingent upon the number of votes necessary to pass or block a
measure before the Council.76
DECISION-MAKING IN THE COUNCIL
The most significant obstacle to completion of the seabed min-
ing negotiations has been the impasse over Council voting proce-
dures.7 7 The means by which special interest groups can insure
that important decisions will not be made contrary to their inter-
ests is by possessing sufficient voting strength in the Council or
by limiting the discretion of the Authority in the provisions of the
treaty itself.7 8 Each of the three main groups in the negotia-
tions--developing countries, Western industrialized countries,
and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe-has insisted on a
voting formula that would protect its own vital interests while still
enabling the Council to function.7 9
Early attempts to develop a voting formula acceptable to all the
interests had little success. The first negotiating text,8 0 issued at
the end of the 1975 Geneva session, provided that voting on sub-
Where it would make a difference whether three or four seats are controlled, the
implications of both will be discussed.
75. Three of the seats will come from those allocated to the nations with the
largest investments in seabed mining. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
Three Council seats will come from those reserved for the major importers and
consumers of the minerals to be obtained from the Area. See text accompanying
notes 65-67 supra. Three seats in the Council will be based on the principle of eq-
uitable geographical distribution. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 80-120 infra.
77. Paul Engo is the chairman of Negotiating Group 3. The group is concerned
with the negotiations relating to the composition, powers and functions of the or-
gans of the Authority. Mr. Engo has said: "The key to success in the negotiations
lay in finding a formula for decisionmaking in the Council.. . ." U.N. Press Re-
lease SEA/422, at 5 (Sept. 2, 1980). See, e.g., Richardson, Introduction, 16 SAN DI-
EGO L. REv. 451, 452 (1979).
78. Richardson, Introduction, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 451, 452 (1979). Ambassa-
dor Richardson states that "It is not at all clear, however, that sufficient details
could be included in such a treaty to overcome a failure to secure a mutually ac-
ceptable and workable decisionmaking structure." Id. Cf. U.N. Press Release
SEA/422, at 5 (Sept. 2, 1980).
79. U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 5 (Sept. 2, 1980).
80. SNT, supra note 40.
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stantive questions in the Council would be by two-thirds-plus-one
of the quorum.81 This system was unacceptable to the Western
industrialized nations because twelve votes would be required for
a veto and the Western industrialized nations could only expect
to control nine Council votes, leaving them with no effective
veto.82 Later versions of the negotiating texts required a three-
quarters majority on substantive questions. 83 This opened the
possibility of a developed nation veto in the Council, if ten votes
could be gathered.84 The Group of 77 was firmly opposed to the
idea of giving any special interest group veto power in the Coun-
cil.85
During the most recent session of UNCLOS ]I,86 the highest
priority was given to the question of decision-making in the Coun-
cil.8 7 The Group of 77 remained adamantly opposed to any voting
mechanism based on weighed voting or a veto for any interest or
geographical group.88 The Western industrialized countries
remained firmly committed to a mechanism that offered protec-
tion for potential seabed miners and consumers against decisions
adverse to their major economic interests.89 The Soviet Union
emphasized that any formulation that accorded the desired pro-
tection for the Western industrialized countries must also accord
similar protection to the Eastern European Socialist countries.90
Nevertheless, two themes emerged from the early discussions;
both offered hope for an acceptable solution to the impasse. First,
that the voting mechanism should be determined by the impor-
tance of the specific issue to be decided.91 Alternatively, that de-
81. Id. art. 27, para. 6.
82. The History, supra note 27, at 499-500.
83. ICNT, supra note 52, art. 159, paras. 6-8; ICNT/R1, supra note 52, art. 161,
paras. 6-7; ICNT/R2, supra note 52, art. 161, paras. 6-7.
84. This voting structure emphasizes the need to develop a meaningful defini-
tion of "equitable geographical distribution." See text accompanying notes 72-74
supra.
85. Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed
Authority, 7 OcEAN DEV. & IN'L L. 31, 57 (1979).
86. The resumed ninth session of the UNCLOS I was held in Geneva begin-
ning on July 28 to August 29, 1980.





91. Id. at 17.
cision-making by consensus is desirable.92
The formula that emerged from the negotiations is a three-
tiered system that divides substantive issues into three catego-
ries. The decisions on the mbst sensitive issues are decided by
consensus.93 Issues of lesser importance may be decided by a
three-fourths, 94 or two-thirds majority.95
Decision-making by consensus gives every member of the
Council the power to defeat a proposal.96 The consensus proce-
dure is acceptable to the Group of 77 because it does not discrimi-
nate among nations. 97 It is a democratic procedure that does not
acknowledge that some members of the Council ought to have
greater power in the decision-making process than others. Rather
than giving a few powerful nations the strength to defeat a propo-
sal by a negative vote, as in the traditional veto system,98 the con-
sensus system gives every member of the Council the power to
defeat a proposal. The power is therefore distributed equally
among all the members of the Council.
The consensus procedure should be acceptable to nations
whose companies and consortia will be making a substantial in-
vestment in deep seabed mining. Developed nations have in-
sisted upon a decision-making process that would allow them to
defeat a proposal injurious to their interests.9 9 The proposed sys-
tem grants that veto power. The consensus system grants the in-
dustrialized nations exactly the kind of protection they have
negotiated for.
Council decisions that are subject to consensus agreement fall
into three basic categories: 1) adoption of the rules, regulations,
and procedures of the Authority;100 2) adoption of measures to
protect land based mineral producers from adverse economic ef-
fects caused by seabed mining; 01 and 3) adoption of amend-
ments to any part of the Convention dealing explicitly with
92. Id.
93. For purposes of this discussion the term consensus means the absence of
any formal objection. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 161, para. 7(e).
94. Id. para. 7(c).
95. Id. para. 7(b).
96. Id. paras. 7(d)-(e).
97. For a discussion of the reasons other voting procedures were unacceptable
to the Group of 77, see generally, Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of
the International Sea-Bed Authority, 7 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 31 (1979).
98. An example of a veto system which gives a few powerful nations the
strength to defeat a proposal by a negative vote is the United Nations Security
Council.
99. See text accompanying notes 77-88 supra.
100. See DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 161, para. 7(d); id. art. 162, para.
2(n) (i) (ii).101. Id. art. 161, para. 7(d), art. 162, para. 2(1), art. 150, para. (g), art. 151.
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exploitation of the Area. 0 2
With regard to the interests of the United States, the most im-
portant issues requiring consensus are decisions on the rules, reg-
ulations and procedures constituting the basic framework for the
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed.103 These deci-
sions are crucial because they shall determine the specific poli-
cies of the Authority concerning prospecting, exploration, and
exploitation in the Area.0 4 Decisions on rules, regulations, and
procedures shall also determine the financial management and in-
ternal administration of the Authority,105 as well as the methods
of promoting the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the
activities in the Area.l06 The consensus requirement will ensure
the United States and its allies a meaningful role in the rule-mak-
ing process.O7
A number of developing countries have expressed skepticism
as to the expedience of the consensus procedure. In the plenary
debate some developing countries argued that granting a veto to
each member of the Council threatened to make the Council inef-
ficient and ineffective. 08 It was feared that the Council might fail
to act on matters affecting the developing countries in particular,
the most important of which are to be subject to the consensus
requirement. 09
These doubts expressed by the developing nations concerning
the consensus procedures are well-founded. The ideological and
102. Id. art. 161, para. 7(d).
103. Id. art. 162, para. 2(n).
104. Id. para. 2(n) (ii).
105. Id.
106. Id. para. 2(n) (i).
107. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 161, para. 7(e). For an illustration of the ef-
fect that consensus procedure will have with regard to protection of United States
interests see notes 123-42 infra and accompanying text.
108. U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 8 (Sept. 2, 1980).
109. Id. This argument could also be advanced by the industrialized nations
because the most important issues dealing with their interests are also subject to
the consensus requirement. See text accompanying notes 103-07 supra.
The main difference between the consensus procedure and the earlier proposals
calling for a three-fourths or two-thirds majority is that the consensus procedure
increases the risk of a veto to a proposal concerning the developing country's in-
terests. Under earlier proposals, a veto may not have been possible. Thus, the
concern is not that the concensus procedure discriminates unfairly against the de-
veloping countries, but that unlike the three-fourths or two-thirds voting require-
ments, the consensus requirement does not discriminate against any interest,
which, with respect to the earlier proposals, is a loss of power to the developing
countries.
economic difference between the developing nations, the Western
industrialized nations, and the Socialist nations of Eastern Eu-
rope are so significant as to make consensus on any significant is-
sue extremely difficult.110 Because of these great differences, the
number of issues subject to the consensus requirement are
few.1 11 The issues subject to decision by consensus, with the ex-
ception of the approval of work plans,112 do not deal with the daily
business of the Council.113 The issues subject to the consensus
requirement are of the type that will arise rarely, usually upon
the occurrence of a predetermined event.114 Thus, while decision-
making by consensus may not be the most efficient procedure, it
may be the only procedure acceptable to all concerned. Further-
more, no other approach yet considered has commanded the
same general support,115 and no other approach can in fact pro-
tect the interests of all concerned.
To reduce the fear that the consensus procedure could be
abused and the Council paralyzed, a conciliation procedure was
added to the Draft Convention.1 1 6 If a member of the Council for-
mally objects to a proposal requiring consensus, the President of
the Council would set up a Conciliation Committee "for the pur-
pose of reconciling the differences and producing a proposal
which could be adopted by consensus."1 17 The Conciliation Com-
mittee would then have fourteen days to reconcile the disagree-
ment and report back to the Council.1 8 If the Conciliation
Committee is unable to recommend a proposal which could be
adopted by consensus, it would set forth the grounds on which
the proposal was being opposed.1 9 The purpose of this procedure
is "to impose pressure on the members of the Council to reconcile
their differences, to accomodate each other and to come to an
agreement."120
The importance of the consensus procedure in protecting
United States interests cannot be overstated. Title n of the Act
110. The negotiations leading to the voting procedure in the Council is a prime
example of the difficulties faced in trying to accommodate divergent interests and
still come up with a workable solution. See generally The History, supra note 27.
111. See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
112. For a discussion of the procedure concerning the approval of work plans
see text accompanying notes 123-42 infra.
113. See DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 162, paras. 2(1), 2(n) (i)-(ii).
114. Id.
115. See The History, supra note 27; Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establish-
ment of the International Sea-Bed Authority, 7 OCEAN DEV. & T'L I 31 (1979).




120. U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 9 (Sept. 2, 1980).
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declares in part, "that any international agreement to which the
United States becomes a party should... provide assured and
nondiscriminatory access.., to the hard mineral resources of the
deep seabed .... ,121 The extent to which such an agreement
conforms to this objective is determined in part by examining
"the structures and decision-making procedures" of the proposed
international regulatory body.1 22 The decision-making process for
approval of the work plans submitted by prospective seabed min-
ers illustrates the significance of the consensus procedure with
regard to Title II's mandate.
ACCESS TO THE DEEP SEABED UNDER THE CONSENSUS PROCEDURE
To gain access to the minerals of the Area, the Draft Conven-
tion would require the prospective miner to submit a work plan to
the Council's Legal and Technical Commission 23 The required
contents of the work plan would be determined by the terms of
the Draft Convention and the uniform and nondiscriminatory re-
quirements established by the rules, regulations and procedures
of the Authorty.124 The Draft Convention requires that a work
plan submitted to the Legal and Technical Commission: be in the
form of a contract;12 5 contain a declaration of sponsorship by an
appropriate State;126 contain an assurance that the applicant will
comply with the provisions for transfer of technology to the Au-
thority127 and accept as enforceable the rules and regulations of
the Authority.128 These requirements will not be difficult to sat-
isfy. Any significant and required contents of work plans will be
established by the rules, regulations and procedures of the Au-
thority.129 As discussed earlier, the rules, regulations and proce-
dures of the Authority would be determined by the Council in
compliance with the consensus procedures. 30 The United States,
therefore, will be able to influence the required content of the
work plans, and thus protect United States' interests.
121. The Act, supra note 8, § 201(1) (A).
122. Id. § 201(2).
123. See DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 153, para. 3.
124. Id. Annex H, art. 6, para. 3.
125. Id. art. 153, para. 3.
126. Id. Annex EI, art. 4, para. 1.
127. Id. Annex II, art. 5, para. 1. See notes 178-84 infra and accompanying text.
128. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, Annex H, art. 3, para. 4(b), art. 4, para. 6(a).
129. Id. Annex HI, art. 6.
130. Id. art. 162, para. 2(n) (ii).
Upon receipt of the work plan the Council's Legal and Techni-
cal Commission must recommend that the Council approve or re-
ject the plan.131 The procedures employed by the Legal and
Technical Commission in making this decision are to be estab-
lished by the rules, regulations and procedures of the Author-
ity.132 The industrialized nations have consistently argued that
the work plan approval process must be as automatic as possible
if the applicant is qualified. 133 By use of the consensus procedure
in formulating the rules, regulations and procedures of the Au-
thority, the industrialized nations may effectively influence the
decision-making procedures to be employed by the Legal and
Technical Commission, and thus protect their interests.
If the Legal and Technical Commission recommends approval
of the work plan, the plan will be deemed approved by the Coun-
cil unless a Council member submits a specific written objection,
alleging noncompliance with the terms of the Convention.134 In
the event that an objection is filed, the dispute will be subjected
to the conciliation procedures discussed above.135 If at the end of
the conciliation process the objection is still maintained, the work
plan will be deemed to have been approved by the Council unless
the Council disapproves the plan by consensus. 3 6
The practical implication of this procedure is to virtually guar-
antee access to the deep seabed if the Legal and Technical Com-
mission approves the work plan. Access could be denied only if
the Council unanimously rejected the work plan. 3 7 Excepting
the situation where rejection of a plan is clearly justified, the
chances of unanimous disapproval of a work plan are essentially
nonexistent because of the likely composition of the Council. 38
Does this procedure constitute assured and nondiscriminatory
131. 1c. art. 165, para. 2(b).
132. Id. art. 163, para. 11. This represents a change from the previous text. The
second revision of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text provided for decision-
making in the Commissions of the Council on the basis of a two-thirds majority of
the members. ICNT/R2, supra note 52, art. 163, para. 10.
133. U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 9 (Sept. 2, 1980).
134. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 162, para. 2(j) (i).
135. Id. For a discussion of the conciliation process see text accompanying
notes 110-20 supra.
136. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 162, para. 2(j) (i). Consensus under this sec-
tion excludes the State or States sponsoring the applicant, otherwise the sponsor-
ing State could block disapproval by the Council (under these circumstances)
merely by casting its vote in favor of approval. Id.
137. Id. The use of "unanimous" here assumes that the sponsoring State will
not participate in the voting.
138. See text accompanying notes 55-76 supra. The sponsoring State, because
of the representation of special interests in the Council, is virtually assured of at
least one ally. This would effectively block disapproval because of the consensus
requirement.
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access to the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed? If the
decision-making criteria of the Legal and Technical Commission
are nondiscriminatory then access to the Area is assured.
The Draft Convention contains a specific caveat to the Author-
ity that the granting of opportunities for activities in the Area
should be exercised so as to avoid discrimination.139 The Draft
Convention directs the Legal and Technical Commission to make
its recommendation to approve or reject a work plan only upon
the terms of the Draft Convention and the rules, regulations and
procedures of the Authority.140 The substantive requirements of
the Draft Convention are neutral on their face'41 and the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority are to be established
by consensus in the Council.142 The proposed international agree-
ment provides for assured and nondiscriminatory access to the
hard minerals of the deep seabed to as great an extent as the
United States can reasonably expect. Therefore, Title I's man-
date concerning assured and nondiscriminatory access to the
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed will be satisfied under
the Draft Convention.
Title H of the Act also prescribes that access to the seabed
should be attained under reasonable terms and conditions,142 and
that the proposed international agreement should provide secur-
ity of tenure to those United States citizens that have undertaken
mining activities before the ratification and entry into force of
such agreement.144 Title H also demands the right to continue
mining operations under terms and conditions which do not im-
pose significant new economic burdens upon United States citi-
zens.145 The intent of the provision is to ensure the continuation
of mining operations on a viable economic basis. 46
SEcuRTY OF TENURE
Representatives of the seabed mining industry have consist-
139. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 152, para. 1.
140. Id. art. 165, para. 2(b).
141. For a discussion of the Draft Convention's requirement see text accompa-
nying notes 55-76 supra.
142. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 161, para. 7(d).
143. The Act, supra note 8, § 201(1) (A).
144. Id. § 201(1)(B).
145. Id.
146. 126 CONG. REc. H4644 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (excerpts from the American
Mining Congress Analysis, reprinted in the remarks of Rep. Derwinski).
ently argued that they cannot prudently make the substantial in-
vestment in exploration and exploitation of the seabed unless the
terms of the proposed international agreement assures security of
tenure to qualified miners.14 7 The mining consortia fears that
substantial investments made in surveying and mining a seabed
site under domestic legislation may be lost if a subsequently rati-
fied international agreement does not guarantee access to the
same site.148
In response to concerns of American mining interests, Ambas-
sador Richardson initiated negotiations to insure the text of the
international agreement incorporated provisions protecting the
preparatory investment.14 9 The negotiations have thus far been
unsuccessful. In the most recent session of the Conference, it be-
came clear that passage of the Act by the United States and pas-
sage of similar legislation by the Federal Republic of Germany
had complicated the negotiations. 5 0 A meeting on the subject,
sponsored by the United States, failed to attract a significant
number of participants from the Group of 77.151 Moreover, the
American Mining Congress has stated its dissatisfaction with the
United States' proposal for the protection of interim invest-
ment.152
The Group of 77 is opposed to the inclusion of preparatory in-
vestment protection in the Law of the Sea Treaty. The developing
countries have continuously opposed deep seabed mining in the
absence of a Law of the Sea Treaty arguing that such action
would violate existing International Law.'5 3 They have also ex-
pressed concern "that treaty provisions aimed at protecting the
continuity of operations of existing private ventures would serve
to move these activities even farther out in front of the Enter-
147. Id.
148. Testimony by Ambassador Richardson before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, April 17, 1980, reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. H4665 (daily ed. June 9,
1980) (remarks of Rep. Bedell).
149. United States Delegation Report, Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, resumed ninth session--Geneva, at 38 (August 29, 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Delegation Report].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See the American Mining Congress analysis of the State Department pro-
posal, reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. H4643-45 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Derwinski).
153. For the views of both sides on the issue of the legality of unilateral seabed
mining, compare U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/77 (April 25, 1979), reprinted in 2 T.
KRONAMLLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINIG 59 (1st ed. 1980) with Mur-
phy, The Politics of Manganese Nodules: International Considerations and Domes-
tic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGO L REV. 531 (1979).
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prise 54 than they are already."' 5 5 The Soviet Union has also sug-
gested that if preparatory investment protection were to be
incorporated into the treaty, early applicants could monopolize
the best mining sites to the disadvantage of later applicants. 5 6
To ease the fears that preparatory investment protection would
give interim seabed miners an unfair competitive advantage over
the Enterprise, the suggestion has been made to create a Prepara-
tory Commission which would prepare for a correspondingly
early start by the Enterprise. 5 7
Under the Act, no permit for commercial recovery may be is-
sued which authorizes recovery to commence before January 1,
1988.158 The restriction on commercial recovery until 1988 repre-
sents a significant change from prior legislative proposals. 5 9 Pre-
vious versions of the bill authorized commercial recovery to begin
after July 1, 1982.160 The significance of this delay in terms of the
negotiations for preparatory investment protection are two-fold.
First, the delay until 1988 should give UNCLOS I[ sufficient time
to negotiate and enter into force a Law of the Sea Treaty. Second,
the delay should ease fears that interim miners under domestic
legislation would gain an insurmountable advantage over the En-
terprise, particularly if the Conference adopted provisions creat-
ing a Preparatory Commission and preparatory investment
protection concurrently. Representatives of the seabed mining in-
dustry have conceded that the delay will not harm them.' 6'
The Draft Convention contains no provision for security of ten-
ure. It can only be hoped that the barriers to an acceptable provi-
154. The Enterprise is the organ of the International Seabed Authority that
would carry out mining activities in the Area on behalf of the Authority. DCLOS/
IT, supra note 22, art. 170, para. 1.
155. Delegation Report, supra note 150, at 38.
156. Id. But cf. the anti-monopoly language contained in the Draft Convention
which should alleviate this concern. DCLOS/fT, supra note 22, Annex DI, art. 6.
157. Compare Plenary Statement by Ambassador Richardson during the Gen-
eral Debate 3 (Aug. 26, 1980) (on fie with the San Diego Law Review) with State-
ment by the Ambassador at large, Elliot L Richardson 2 (Aug. 29, 1980) (on file
with the San Diego Law Review).
158. The Act, supra note 8, § 102(c) (1) (D). This section does not preclude issu-
ance of a permit for commercial recovery before 1988. Nevertheless, the permit
does restrict commercial recovery until January 1, 1988. See H.R REP. No. 411 P.
I, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3059, 3085.
159. H.R. REP. No. 411 P. H, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1979), reprinted in [1980]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3059, 3085.
160. 126 CONG. REC. H4642 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (remarks by Rep. McClos-
key).
161. Id. at H4665 (remarks by Rep. Bedell). 527
sion providing protection for interim investment can be overcome.
Considering all of the factors the outlook is favorable. Before the
recently concluded ninth session in Geneva, Ambassador Rich-
ardson expressed optimism, 62 that optimism should not yet be
abandoned.
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF SEABED MINING UNDER THE
LAW OF THE SEA TREATY
The economic burdens experienced by seabed miners under
the Draft Convention would probably be greater than those im-
posed under the Act. This development would not be surpris-
ing.16 3 Whether the burdens imposed under the international
regime envisioned by the Draft Convention are reasonable or
would allow mining operations to be exercised on a viable eco-
nomic basis are questions upon which reasonable minds may dif-
fer. A detailed analysis of the economic conditions imposed
under a regime adopted on the basis of the Draft Convention is
not possible, because many of the economic requirements have
not yet been established.164 Nevertheless, a few general com-
ments can be made.
The financial terms of mining contracts between State Spon-
sored miners and the Authority have generally been agreed
upon.16 5 The system, as envisioned by the Draft Convention, re-
quires any one holding a mining contract from the Authority to
162. Ambassador Richardson has stated that he has "had the opportunity to de-
velop among delegations of developing countries an understanding of the need for
preparatory investment protection and an appreciation of the desirability of clear-
ing the way for seabed mining to get underway... as soon as possible following
entry into force of the treaty." Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, April 17, 1980, reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. H4665 (daily ed. June 9, 1980)
(remarks by Rep. Bedell).
163. It was argued in the House debates, that §201(1)(B) of the Act was
drafted with the understanding that the terms of an international regime would
probably be less favorable to United States interests than the Act. Id. at H4665
(remarks of Rep. Bedell). Alternate language was suggested for § 201(1) (B) that
would have required that treaty terms be "substantially the same" as those in the
Act rather than requiring that treaty provisions "do not impose significant new ec-
onomic burdens... with the effect of preventing the continuation of such opera-
tions on a viable economic basis." It was argued that this language recognized
that economic terms under an international regime could be less attractive than
those imposed by the Act, while still satisfying the Congressional mandate of Title
1I. 126 CONG. REC. H4649 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Bingham); 126
CONG. REc. H4665 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Bedell).
164. See, DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, Annex II, art. 13.
165. Ambassador Koh, chairman of the negotiating group dealing with the
financial concerns of seabed mining, reported that "the Group of 77, the Socialist
countries of Eastern Europe, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several
other industrialized nations have expressed their ability to live with this propo-
sal." U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 15 (Sept. 2, 1980).
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pay an initial $500,000 application fee covering the administrative
cost of processing the application;166 an annual fixed fee of $1 mil-
lion;167 and periodic payments to the Authority based on the
value of production and/or the financial return from mining activ-
ities.168 Additional financial terms are to be adopted in the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority.169 These additional
financial terms are to be adopted with the aim of ensuring opti-
mum revenues for the Authority while stimulating investment by
States or State sponsored miners and are to be applied on a uni-
form and nondiscriminatory basis. 1 7 0
Indirect financial conditions will also affect the feasibility of
seabed mining under the Draft Convention. One of the most con-
tested economic issues discussed in the Conference has been how
to promote seabed mining without wreaking havoc on the econo-
mies of the land-based producers of the same minerals.' 7 ' The
main opponents in the controversy are the major mineral con-
sumers on one side and the land-based producers of the minerals
on the other.17 2 The production formula proposed by the Draft
Convention would allow seabed miners to produce up to sixty
percent of the projected annual increase in the world's demand
for nickel,173 leaving the remaining forty percent to be produced
166. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, Annex III, art. 13, para. 2. If the cost of process-
ing the application is less than $500,000, the difference would be refunded to the
applicant. Id.
167. Id. para. 3.
168. Id. paras. 4-6.
169. Id. para. 1. The rules, regulations and procedures are to be adopted by
consensus in the Council and approved by the Assembly. The industrialized na-
tions should therefore be able to ensure the reasonableness of any additional
financial terms and conditions. See text accompanying notes 93-107 supra.
170. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, Annex HI, art. 13, para. 1. The additional
financial terms and condition will also: attract investments and technology; en-
sure equality of financial treatment to all States or State sponsored miners; pro-
vide incentives on a uniform and nondiscriminatory basis for contractors to
undertake joint ventures With the Enterprise or developing nations; enable the
Enterprise to engage in seabed mining at the same time as State sponsored min-
ers; and ensure that financial incentives provided to contractors shall not result in
subsidizing contractors with the effect of placing them at an artifically competitive
advantage relative to land-based producers. Id. paras. 1(a)-(f).
171. U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 11 (Sept. 2, 1980).
172. Id. The interests are actually more varied than this statement suggests.
Additionally, consideration must be accorded to the interests of newcomers to the
land-based mining industry, to potential land-based miners, consumer nations that
plan to invest in seabed mining soon and to consumer nations which do not plan
to invest in seabed mining. Id.
173. The production control formula linked to nickel would allow seabed pro-
by land-based miners.174
Even though seabed production is limited by this formula, the
land-based mineral producers argue that they need greater pro-
tection against what they view as "potentially unfair competi-
tion."75 The consuming nations argue that the Draft Convention
goes as far as they can allow in protecting land-based miners.176
Consumer nations contend that any stricter production limita-
tions would threaten the economic viability of seabed mining.177
Another condition affecting the economic feasibility of mining
activities in the Area is a provision requiring, under specified cir-
cumstances, the transfer of the technology used in seabed opera-
tions 178 from the State sponsored seabed miner to the
Authority.179 Unlike the economic conditions discussed above,
the provision requiring the transfer of technology could enhance
the economic feasibility of seabed mining.
Under the Draft Convention, the Enterprise, when seeking re-
quired technology, must make a good faith effort to obtain the
technology it requires on the open market.180 Only if the Enter-
prise is "unable to obtain the same or equally efficient and useful
technology on the open market on fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions," may the Enterprise invoke the technology
transfer provisions.181 In the event the Enterprise determined
that it must turn to the contractor for the required technology, the
contractor and the Enterprise would negotiate for the transfer on
fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions.182
Although the seabed mining companies have been critical of
the requirements transfering technology, the practical effects of
the provisions would be to enhance the profitability of seabed
duction of the other minerals to be derived from the Area, principally cobalt and
manganese in excess of the growth in demand for these minerals. Id.
174. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, art. 151, para. 2(b) (ii).
175. U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 11 (Sept. 2, 1980).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 11.
178. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, Annex 1II, art. 5, para. 8. Under this provision
"technology" is defined as "the specialized equipment and technical know-how, in-
cluding manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and technical advice and
assistance, necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a viable system and the
legal right to use those items for that purpose on a non-exclusive basis." Id.
Many developing nations have called for a more specific definition that would
cover mineral processing, transportation and even marketing. Industrialized na-
tions have opposed any change, arguing that the types of technology referred to by
the developing countries are not specific to seabed mining and are readily avail-
able on the open market. U.N. Press Release, SEA/422, at 14. (Sept. 2, 1980).
179. DCLOS/IT, supra note 22, Annex III, art. 5.
180. Id. para. 5.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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mining. Seabed mining technology has been developed at an
enormous cost183 that will continue into the foreseeable future. 184
The provisions for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise
under reasonable terms and conditions could considerably ease
the burden of the enormous expense required to develop this
technology. The result would be that the mining companies
would have someone to help share these expenses, thus making
mining under the international regime proposed by the Draft
Convention a little less economically burdensome.
CONCLUSION
Title II of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act is in-
tended to perform two functions. First, it is a set of instructions
by Congress to the Law of the Sea negotiators regarding general
policies that Congress intends to be in the final text of any Law of
the Sea Treaty. Secondly, Title 11 may be viewed as a measuring
rod by which the Senate should evaluate a treaty submitted to it
for ratification.
It was argued in the Congressional debates that Title II was
drafted with the understanding that the terms of an international
regime would most likely be less favorable to United States inter-
ests than the Act.185 Alternative language was suggested that
would have required that treaty terms be "substantially the
same" as those in the Act rather than requiring that treaty provi-
sions "do not impose significant new economic burdens... with
the effect of preventing the continuation of such operations on a
viable economic basis."186 According to some, this provision does
not require guaranteed access or security of tenure under terms,
conditions and restrictions which do not impose significant new
economic burdens because any international agreement should
be viewed with respect to the totality of its provisions in order to
assure a balanced assessment of the entire treaty with respect to
the national interest.187 A literal reading of Title H supports this
assertion.
The composition of the Council and the decision-making pro-
183. The Act, supra note 8, § 2(a) (11).
184. Id.
185. 126 CONG. REC. H4665 (daily ed. June 9, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Bedell).
186. Id.
187. Id. at H4649; (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id. at H4665 (remarks of Rep. Be-
dell).
cess entailed in the Draft Convention effectively grant access to
the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis. The mandate of Title 11 in this respect is satisfied.
The present Draft Convention contains no provisions granting
security of tenure. Without protection for investments made dur-
ing the interim between enactment of the legislation and ratifica-
tion of a Law of the Sea Treaty, domestic mining companies
cannot prudently make the huge investment necessary to carry
on the progress towards exploitation of the seabed. Failure to
provide for security of tenure in an international agreement could
become the basis for the Senate's refusal to ratify a proposed
treaty.188
The economic burdens experienced by seabed miners under
the international regime proposed by the Draft Convention would
probably be more severe than those imposed under the Act. But
the Act was designed almost exclusively for the protection of
United States' interests, whereas the Law of the Sea Treaty is be-
ing designed for the benefit of all of mankind. Whether the eco-
nomic burdens sustained under an international agreement
proposed by the Draft Convention would be too severe for State
sponsored miners to operate on a viable economic basis, cannot
yet be determined. Provisions in the Draft Convention for the
transfer of technology should make the economic yoke easier for
the State sponsored miner to bear.
The mandate of Title 1 has not yet been realized, but satisfac-
tion of the intent embodied in the Act is within reach.
F. PATTERSON WILLSEY
188. Id. at H4667 (remarks of Rep. Symms).
